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I. INTRODUCTION
In between U.S. citizens on one end of the spectrum and illegal aliens
on the other lies a group of individuals who are intimately connected to
the United States but with fewer protections than U.S. citizens. Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs), informally known as “green card holders,”
occupy a special place in the United States. As their name implies, they
have been granted the ability to permanently reside in the United States,1
presumably as a stepping stone toward full U.S. citizenship. Approximately
13 million individuals are currently categorized as LPRs.2
Most of these 13 million individuals fall squarely within the purpose
of their status. They are resident in the United States, fully law-abiding, and
intent on taking the steps necessary to gain U.S. citizenship. Unfortunately,
many LPRs do not fit within the intent and purpose of LPR status.
Specifically, they are no longer resident in the United States and have
demonstrated no plan to return. More troubling, a significant number of
these “out-of-status” LPRs not only have zero intention of permanently
residing in the United States but also are terrorists engaged in activities
intended to harm the United States. Individuals who fall within this
category are sprinkled throughout the terrorist hierarchy, from line soldiers
to recruiters to one of al Qaeda’s top operatives. Here are a few examples:
 Najibullah Zazi is an LPR who traveled overseas for the intended
purpose of fighting Americans in Afghanistan.3 After receiving
training at an al Qaeda camp, the terrorist organization directed
Mr. Zazi to return to the United States in 2009 in order to stage
an attack on the New York City subway system using homemade
improvised explosive devices.4
 Approximately thirty U.S. residents, including many LPRs,
have traveled to Somalia since 2007 in order to join Al Shabaab,
an al Qaeda-connected terrorist group.5 Amongst this group
were five young, male, Somali LPRs who left Minnesota

1.
2.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012).
See NANCY RYTINA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2011, at 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/ois_lpr_pe_2011.pdf.
3. See Lauren B. O’Brien, The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11, FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Sept. 2011, at 4; Mosi Secret, Jury Convicts U.S. Citizen in Plot
To Bomb City’s Subways, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at A19.
4. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 4, 6, 8; Secret, supra note 3, at A19, A24.
5. See Responding to the Call: Al Qaeda’s American Recruits, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE (July 25, 2011), http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_qaeda_american_recruits.htm.
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in 2007 in order to train with the terrorist organization.6
Believed to still be in Somalia working with Al Shabaab,
these five LPRs were charged in a U.S. indictment in 2009 with
providing and conspiring to provide material support to
terrorists, as well as conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure.7
The individual who recruited these young Minnesotans for Al
Shabaab was also an LPR residing overseas.8
 Habis Abdulla al Saoub is an LPR who was a member of the
“Portland Seven,” an infamous terrorist cell in Portland,
Oregon.9 He fled overseas in 2001 to avoid arrest.10 He has
been placed on the FBI’s most wanted list, with U.S. authorities
offering $5 million for information leading to his capture or
conviction.11
 Most concerning perhaps is Adnan Shukrijumah, an LPR who
at one time was a student at Broward Community College in
Florida.12 Shukrijumah left Florida in the early 2000s to join

6. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, AL SHABAAB’S AMERICAN RECRUITS 1, 12–14
(2013), available at http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-americanrecruits.pdf. The United States designated Al Shabaab as a terrorist organization in 2008.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/
123085.htm (last visited May 26, 2014).
7. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 6, at 12–14. The family of one of
these LPRs claims that he was killed while fighting in Somalia in July 2009. Id. at 14.
8. See id. at 12.
9. See Habis Abdulla al Saoub, GLOBAL JIHAD (Apr. 9, 2008, 6:56 AM) http://
www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1096; Peter Y. Hong, Portland Terror Suspect
Released Pending Trial, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/11/
nation/na-portland11.
10. Habis Abdulla al Saoub, supra note 9.
11. See id.; Two Plead Guilty in Oregon Terror Case, CNN (Oct. 16, 2003, 6:21
PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2003-10-16/justice/terror.suspects_1_qaeda-habis-abdulla-alsaoub-october-martinique-lewis?_s=PM:LAW. There are reports that al Saoub was killed in
Pakistan in 2003. See Habis Abdulla al-Saoub, DISCOVERTHENETWORKS.ORG,
http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/individualProfile.asp?indid=724 (last visited May
26, 2014).
12. See Fla. Mom Says Son Is Not a High-Ranking al Qaeda Terrorist, but a Kind
Boy, N.Y. POST (Aug. 7, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/kind
_mom_says_son_terrorist_not_aBCgnOItZO16AXv57TASMP [hereinafter Fla. Mom]
(reporting that a Florida resident named Adnan Shukrijumah traveled to Afghanistan to
learn battle tactics from al Qaeda and subsequently returned to the United States to
participate in the plot to bomb the New York City subway system). Some reports have
erroneously claimed that Shukrijumah is a naturalized U.S. citizen. See, e.g., William K.
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al Qaeda.13 He originally trained with Jose Padilla to engage in
various terrorist activities on behalf of the organization14 but
has steadily moved up al Qaeda’s ranks. He is now believed
to be al Qaeda’s head of global operations, a rank generally
considered to be the third highest in the organization and a
position once held by alleged 9/11-mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed. 15 In 2010, the U.S. government indicted
Shukrijumah in the Eastern District of New York for his alleged
involvement in terrorist plots against subway targets in both
the United States and Great Britain. 16 He is currently on
the FBI’s most wanted terrorist list with a $5 million reward
for information leading to his capture.17 He remains in hiding
overseas.18
These and similar LPR terrorists who have been out of the country for
months if not years sully the good name of the vast majority of LPRs
who are actually residents here and entirely law-abiding. Such out-ofstatus LPR terrorists also may be taking away immigration opportunities
that could be provided to others.19 More concerning, their LPR status
allows them to enter the United States more easily,20 possibly to commit
terrorist attacks. Typically, LPRs who have been overseas for a
Rashbaum, Shadowy Qaeda Leader Is Indicted in Subway Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 2010, at A18.
13. See Fla. Mom, supra note 12.
14. JANICE L. KEPHART, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION AND
TERRORISM: MOVING BEYOND THE 9/11 STAFF REPORT ON TERRORIST TRAVEL 19 (2005),
available at http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2005/kephart.pdf.
15. See Fla. Mom, supra note 12.
16. Most Wanted Terrorists: Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/adnan-g.-el-shukrijumah (last visited May
26, 2014).
17. Id.
18. See Fla. Mom, supra note 12.
19. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003) (noting with approval
Congress’s statement that “aliens who enter or remain in the United States in violation of
our law are effectively taking immigration opportunities that might otherwise be extended to
others” (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 7 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE 6
(2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/119xx/doc11959/
12-03-immigration_chartbook.pdf (discussing in detail the numeric limitations of certain
categories of persons eligible for admission for LPR status).
20. See International Travel as a Permanent Resident, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7
543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=0c353a4107083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel
=0c353a4107083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated July 26, 2010) (asserting
that an LPR needs only a valid, unexpired permanent resident card to reenter the United States
after overseas travel).
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significantly long period of time are required to formally “abandon” their
LPR status if and when they seek to enter the United States.21 However,
even if an LPR agrees to abandon LPR status, it is usually in exchange
for the opportunity to enter the country on a visa.22 If the LPR is traveling
to the United States in order to commit a terrorist attack, relinquishing
LPR status in exchange for admission is quite a good deal. Indeed, there
is significant evidence that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are
seeking to recruit U.S. citizens and LPRs precisely due to the relative ease
with which they can pierce U.S. borders and operate in the United States.23
As one observer notes, LPR status affords terrorists “almost complete
freedom of action, without most of the restrictions that encumber visitors,
not to mention illegal aliens.”24 It seems to be a successful campaign, as the
number of such U.S. and LPR terrorists appears to be increasing.25
Perhaps most critical, the LPR status of these overseas terrorists hinders
the U.S. government’s ability to locate and monitor them, share information
on them amongst U.S. government agencies, develop evidence to prosecute

21. See Bigler v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 451 F.3d 728, 730 (11th Cir. 2006)
(discussing how an LPR had to fill out a form abandoning LPR status in order to reenter
the United States); Igbanugo, Unintentional Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident
Status: Causes, Consequences and Prevention, MSHALE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://mshale.
com/2011/10/21/unintentional-abandonment-of-lawful-permanent-resident-status-causes-cons
equences-and-prevention/ (describing how LPRs may have to abandon status to reenter
the United States); International Travel as a Permanent Resident, supra note 20.
22. See Bigler, 451 F.3d at 730 (describing how an out-of-status LPR was issued
an entry visa after agreeing to formally abandon status). Even if the LPR refuses to
formally abandon LPR status, the U.S. government will typically take the person’s
“green card,” stamp the individual’s foreign passport allowing one year of reentry to the
United States, and serve the individual with a Notice to Appear before an immigration
court to explain why the individual’s LPR status should not be revoked. Erinna Delle
Brodsky, Losing a Green Card, LAW BRODSKY, http://www.lawbrodsky.com/losing_a_
green_card.htm (last visited May 26, 2014).
23. See Catherine Herridge, Al Qaeda in Yemen Targets More American Recruits,
FOX NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/01/10/al-qaeda-inyemen-targets-more-american-recruits/; Al Qaeda Recruits a Growing Number of Americans,
NEWSWEEK, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/09/29/homecoming.html (last
updated July 1, 2010, 1:41 PM).
24. Mark Krikorian, Eternal Vigilance: Handing Out Green Cards Is a Security
Matter, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (July 2002), http://cis.org/GreenCardSecurity.
25. See Andrea Stone, No-Fly List Maintained by FBI Includes Double the U.S.
Citizens Since 2009, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/01/nofly-list_n_1563261.html (last updated June 1, 2012, 5:26 PM) (noting that the number of
U.S. citizens and green card holders on the FBI’s terrorist watchlist has more than
doubled since 2009).
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them, and take action against them to prevent them from engaging in a
terrorist attack.26 LPRs—even overseas, out-of-status, terrorist LPRs—
are protected by at least some aspects of the U.S. Constitution wherever
they reside, though the courts are still trying to determine exactly which
constitutional rights apply to LPRs overseas.27 Critical statutes and
executive orders also serve to protect such LPRs, including key portions
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), the Privacy
Act of 1974, and Executive Order (EO) 12,333.28
As a result, individuals who have violated every provision and concept
of their LPR status, are focused on destroying this country, and would be
stripped of their LPR status and removed from this country—and possibly
prosecuted—if they resided in the United States or appeared at U.S.
borders are permitted to remain protected by their LPR status because they
reside overseas and out of U.S. government reach. Further, there is no
indication that the U.S. government has taken any steps to strip these
overseas terrorists of their LPR status. I have been unable to find a single
court case—whether in federal, state, or immigration court—in which the
U.S. government has attempted to revoke the status of an out-of-status LPR.
There is no indication that any member of Congress or the executive branch
has raised the issue in any speech or report. In fact, I was unable even to
find mention of the matter in a single law review, magazine, or newspaper
article. And this gap in discussion applies not just to revoking the status
of overseas LPR terrorists but indeed to the revocation of the status of
any overseas LPR, regardless of how long the LPR may have been
abroad and what the LPR may have been doing. Indeed, it is difficult to
find any discussion at all of the issue of overseas LPRs in any statute,
court case, scholarly writing, or media piece.

26. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212, 215–16 (1982), reprinted as
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 57–66 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Krikorian, supra
note 24.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–68 (1990)
(suggesting that portions of the U.S. Constitution, especially the portions of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments that regulate procedure in criminal trials, may apply to persons
overseas who have developed significant connections with the United States); United
States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is yet to be decided, however,
whether a resident alien [is protected by the Fourth Amendment] when he or she steps
outside the territorial borders of the United States.” (citation omitted)); Tung Yin,
Procedural Due Process To Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on
Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 376–77 (2006) (noting that some protections of the
Bill of Rights, such as portions of the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Amendments,
would not work well outside of the country as they could open the U.S. government to
lawsuits for foreign policy activities).
28. See infra Part III.A–B.
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This Article therefore seeks to break the silence by examining the
issue of overseas LPRs and offering a mechanism by which the U.S.
government could take affirmative action to file cases in immigration
courts to strip out-of-status LPR terrorists of their LPR status. As the
United States legally can, and routinely does, revoke the LPR status of
out-of-status LPRs who appear at U.S. borders,29 the United States could
also take away such status for those who have resorted to terror, without
having to wait—perhaps in vain—for them to appear on the United States’
doorstep. The purpose of granting an individual LPR status is, as the name
suggests, to allow that person to reside permanently inside the United
States as an initial stage toward U.S. citizenship. Out-of-status terrorists
display by their acts and deeds that they have no interest in this goal and
indeed embody the exact antithesis of the purpose of Lawful Permanent
Resident status, given that they are in fact unlawful, nonpermanent, and
nonresident. And, although their numbers might not yet be enormous, as
case after case after case has demonstrated, even terrorists in small numbers
can have grave impact.30 Indeed, out-of-status terrorist LPRs raise an even
greater threat than standard terrorists due to the above-mentioned ability
of such LPR terrorists to travel into the United States and the legal
limitations on the U.S. government to track and thwart them.
Part II of this Article provides a background on immigration law in
general and LPR status in particular. Part III evaluates the limits that the
Constitution and U.S. laws place on the government’s ability to locate,
monitor, track, collect evidence on, and prevent attacks by overseas terrorist
LPRs. Part IV depicts the current mechanisms for revoking LPR status
as a general matter—mechanisms that the government routinely uses
with regard to LPRs inside the United States but has thus far chosen not
to employ with regard to out-of-status overseas LPRs. Finally, Part V
describes how the United States could take affirmative steps to use existing
statutory and case law to strip out-of-status terrorist LPRs of their status
in a manner that fully comports with due process.

29. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Dist. Dir., 539 F.2d 1220, 1222–25 (9th Cir. 1976).
30. See, e.g., 9/11 Attacks, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks
(last visited May 26, 2014); 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, 9/11 MEMORIAL,
http://www.911memorial.org/1993-world-trade-center-bombing (last visited May 26, 2014).
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II. BACKGROUND
U.S. statutes define an alien as any person who is “not a citizen or
national of the United States.”31 LPR is defined as an alien who has been
“lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such
status not having changed.”32 The number of individuals with LPR status
has increased dramatically in recent years.33 Approximately 600,000
individuals were granted LPR status in 2000; by 2011, that number
had surged to more than 1 million.34 As noted above, there are now
approximately 13 million individuals holding U.S. LPR status.35
Among aliens, lawful permanent residence is considered the “gold
standard,”36 just one notch below U.S. citizenship.37 As Supreme Court
Justice Souter has stated, “The immigration laws give LPRs the opportunity
to establish a life permanently in this country by developing economic,
familial, and social ties indistinguishable from those of a citizen.”38 He
further notes that
LPRs share in the economic freedom enjoyed by citizens: they may compete
for most jobs in the private and public sectors without obtaining job-specific
authorization, and apart from the franchise, jury duty, and certain forms of
public assistance, their lives are generally indistinguishable from those of United
States citizens.39

LPRs also have considerable flexibility in leaving the United States
for limited trips and as one commentator has described, “may travel for
short periods of time as freely as their passports and pocketbooks will
allow.”40 Generally speaking, immigration statutes and regulations permit
LPRs to travel outside the United States for up to six months without
31.
32.
33.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012).
See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42866, PERMANENT
LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY OVERVIEW 6–9 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42866.pdf.
34. See id. at 7 fig.2, 8.
35. See RYTINA, supra note 2, at 1.
36. Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by
Noncitizens, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 205 (2007).
37. Krikorian, supra note 24.
38. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 544 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
39. Id.; see also Alvarez v. Dist. Dir., 539 F.2d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1976)
(recognizing the ability of LPRs to work in the United States); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 19, at 5 (“LPRs are eligible to live and work in the United States, own
property, and join the armed forces . . . .”).
40. Morawetz, supra note 36, at 205; see also Alvarez, 539 F.2d at 1224 (noting
that LPRs can make short trips outside the United States).
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any restrictions, including the need for a visa.41 An absence of more than
six months will generally require an LPR to obtain an immigrant visa and
be subject to other requirements42 and may be considered as breaking
the continuous residency necessary for acquiring U.S. citizenship.43
Stay away for more than a year, and the U.S. government generally
considers the LPR to have effectively abandoned LPR status.44
However, if they remain in the United States, LPRs are eligible to be
placed on the short list to become naturalized U.S. citizens. Pending
satisfaction of certain eligibility requirements,45 LPRs generally can apply
to become U.S. citizens after five years of residence or as little as three
years if they marry a U.S. citizen.46 LPRs can also acquire U.S. visas for
their family members.47 Once they become U.S. citizens, they can then
sponsor a foreign national spouse and certain other foreign national family
members for LPR status.48
Like U.S. citizens, LPRs are fully protected by the U.S. Constitution
when they reside inside the United States.49 As discussed in Part III.C
below, LPRs also appear to be protected by at least parts of the Constitution
even when they are overseas.
III. LIMITATIONS ON U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTION WITH
REGARD TO OVERSEAS LPRS
The LPR status of overseas terrorists places significant restrictions on
the ability of the United States to prevent terrorism. Specifically, such
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii) (2012); Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1515
(9th Cir. 1997) (noting that an LPR does not need a visa to return to the United States);
Aleem v. Perryman, 114 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Morawetz, supra note 36,
at 205–06.
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012); Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479,
1485 (2012).
43. See International Travel as a Permanent Resident, supra note 20.
44. See id.
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (2012).
46. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.2 (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 319.1 (2013); see also Jose Antonio
Vargas, Not Legal Not Leaving, TIME, June 25, 2012, at 34, 38 (noting that “[o]nce you
have a green card, you’re on your way to eventual citizenship”).
47. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 19, at 10–11.
48. Id.
49. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212–13 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886); DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1999).
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LPR status limits the ability of the U.S. government to find and monitor
such terrorists, share information about them with other U.S. government
agencies, procure evidence to prosecute them, and take steps to prevent
them from engaging in terrorist attacks.
A. Finding and Monitoring Terrorists
EO 12,333 is a presidential directive originally issued by President
Reagan in 1981.50 Amended several times since,51 EO 12,333 is considered
the seminal presidential order for the U.S. intelligence community,
providing guidance and restrictions on what the U.S. government can
and cannot do to protect national security.52
Amongst its various provisions, EO 12,333 sets limitations on the U.S.
government’s ability to collect information overseas against “United States
persons,” which it defines as including not just U.S. citizens but also
LPRs.53 The intelligence community must employ “the least intrusive
collection techniques feasible” to collect information on U.S. persons.54
Further, physical surveillance of U.S. persons overseas can be conducted
only if its purpose is to collect “significant” foreign intelligence that cannot
reasonably be acquired by other methods.55
Most critically, EO 12,333 precludes the U.S. government from engaging
in electronic surveillance, unconsented physical searches, mail surveillance,
physical surveillance, or video monitoring against U.S. persons overseas
unless such actions “are in accordance with procedures established by
the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or the head
of a department containing such element and approved by the Attorney
General, after consultation with the [Director of National Intelligence].”56
The Attorney General must then, on a case-by-case basis, personally
approve the use of any such technique against a U.S. person abroad after
determining “that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power” and that
the collection conforms with the FISA.57

50. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 26.
51. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,284, 3 C.F.R. 161, 163, (2004), reprinted as
amended in 6 U.S.C. § 121, at 764 (2012) (amending Exec. Order No. 12,333); Exec.
Order No. 13,355, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2005) (same); Exec. Order No. 13,470, 3 C.F.R. 218
(2009) (same).
52. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 26, § 1.1.
53. Id. § 3.4(i).
54. Id. § 2.4.
55. Id. § 2.4(d).
56. Id. § 2.4.
57. Id. §§ 2.4, 2.5.
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The FISA statute also defines United States persons to include LPRs.58
Generally speaking, the statute requires the U.S. government to acquire a
warrant from a special U.S. federal court in Washington, D.C. in order to
target U.S. persons overseas using electronic surveillance59 or to use
other collection techniques—such as video monitoring, conducting physical
searches, or opening mail—where the U.S. person “has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition
were conducted inside the United States for law enforcement purposes.”60
Acquisition of such FISA warrants is a complicated, difficult, and timeconsuming affair.61 In 2007, then-Director of National Intelligence Mike
McConnell estimated that it took about 200 man-hours for the U.S.
government to get a FISA warrant to collect on just a single telephone
number of a U.S. person.62
B. Sharing Information About Terrorists
The Privacy Act prohibits any U.S. government agency from disclosing
“any record which is contained in a system of records” to any person or
even to another U.S. government agency, absent various exceptions or
the consent of the individual to whom the record pertains.63 Its restrictions,
however, apply to protect only the records of U.S. citizens and LPRs.64 It
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2006).
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(a)(1) (2006).
60. 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2) (2006).
61. See Chris Roberts, Transcript: Debate on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, EL PASO TIMES (Aug. 22, 2007, 1:05 AM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/
ci_6685679 (discussing then-Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell’s lament
about the extraordinary difficulty in acquiring FISA warrants); Douglas Waller, A Better
Way To Eavesdrop?, TIME (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1155835,00.html (noting complaints by the Bush Administration that obtaining a
FISA warrant took too long and required too much paperwork).
62. Roberts, supra note 61 (interviewing then-Director of National Intelligence Mike
McConnell).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012).
64. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (2012); see also Adjudicator’s Field Manual—
Redacted Public Version, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/
docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-1067/0-0-0-1780.html (last visited May 26,
2014) (“The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, establishes safeguards for the protection of
records the Government collects and maintains on United States citizens and lawfully
admitted permanent residents.”); Frequent Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/privacy/faqs/index.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2013) (“The Privacy
Act only applies to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident aliens . . . .”); Frequently
Asked Questions—General Information, O FF. S ECRETARY D EF . & J OINT S TAFF ,
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therefore precludes U.S. government agencies from sharing information
amongst themselves with regard to LPR terrorists, unless a given
government record related to an LPR fits within one of the exceptions
listed in the statute.65 Failure to comply exposes violators to both civil
suit and criminal penalty.66
C. Taking Action To Prevent Terrorist Attacks
Once an overseas LPR terrorist has been identified, the U.S. government
would obviously like to be able to take action to prevent the LPR from
launching a terrorist attack. Most ideally, this would involve bringing the
terrorist to justice by prosecuting and convicting the LPR in a U.S. court
and then imprisoning the LPR in a U.S. jail where the LPR can no longer
commit terrorist acts. Alternatively, either alone or in conjunction with
another country, the government might also wish to seize the LPR’s
property or bank accounts to eliminate financing options or may desire to
detain the individual for questioning.
The LPR status of these overseas terrorists, however, complicates matters
and may in fact preclude the ability of the U.S. government to take some
or all of these actions to prevent terrorist attacks. The issue hinges on
whether overseas LPRs are entitled to constitutional protections, and in
particular, whether they are entitled to the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and warrant requirement and
the Fifth Amendment’s due process protection.67
Unfortunately, the question of whether overseas LPRs are protected by
the Constitution is an extremely murky area. As one commentator has
noted, it is an issue that has “bedeviled the courts” time and time again.68
It is well established that all LPRs, as well as all U.S. citizens and indeed
all aliens, including those illegally inside U.S. borders, are protected by
the U.S. Constitution when they reside inside the United States.69 Whether

http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/privacy/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.html (last visited May
26, 2014) (“The Privacy Act only applies to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident
aliens . . . .”).
65. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
66. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g), 552a(i) (2012).
67. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V.
68. Kevin Johnson, Argument Preview: The Rights of Lawful Permanent Residents
Returning to the U.S., SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 15, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2012/01/argument-preview-the-rights-of-lawful-permanent-residents-returning-to-the-u-s/.
69. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“It has been settled for over a century that all aliens within
our territory are ‘persons’ entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause.”); Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the
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such constitutional protections, and especially the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, apply to LPRs outside U.S. borders becomes less clear.
As noted in the discussion below, however, it does appear that at least
some provisions of those amendments protect LPRs overseas and therefore
restrict the U.S. government’s ability to take action against them.70
Moreover, until the courts decide these matters definitively, there is valid
reason to believe that U.S. government agencies operate under the
presumption that these provisions do in fact apply to overseas LPRs and
therefore self-regulate their actions against LPRs given that a mistake in
this area would not only violate the premier law of this land but could
also subject individual government employees to personal liability.71
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part for the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”72 The Supreme Court has determined
that by using the term the people, the Founders of this country intended
the extraterritorial protections of the Fourth Amendment to apply solely
to “a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
part of that community.”73 Based upon this, the Court concluded that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect aliens overseas who have no

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (“[A] lawful resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his
constitutional rights to procedural due process.”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886) (holding that Chinese aliens in the United States are entitled to due process);
DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is undisputable that our constitution
provides due process and equal protection guarantees to aliens as well as citizens.”).
70. See infra Part III.C.1–2.
71. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that government officers can be sued in their personal
capacity for violating certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution). Thus far, the Court
has authorized Bivens claims only for certain alleged constitutional violations, including
claims for Fourth Amendment violations, but not yet for claims of violations of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process provisions. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir.
2009) (en banc).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
73. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
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connection with the United States.74 On the flip side, the Court indicated
that the amendment clearly applies to protect U.S. citizens overseas.75
Whether it also applies to overseas LPRs has not been clarified by the
courts. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “It is yet to be decided, however,
whether a resident alien has . . . ‘otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country,’ to be considered one of ‘the People of the United States’
even when he or she steps outside the territorial borders of the United
States.”76 However, all indications are that it should. After all, as noted
above, no category of noncitizens has established a greater connection to
the United States than LPRs.77 If the Supreme Court did not intend the
phrase “a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community”78 to apply to LPRs, then it is difficult to
imagine who the Court believes could possibly fit into this category. Put
another way, if the Supreme Court believed extraterritorial Fourth
Amendment protections extended solely to U.S. citizens, then it easily
could have so stated. By using the more expansive “sufficient connection”
language, the Court has indicated that the protection applies beyond U.S.
citizens, with LPRs logically fitting into this more expansive category.
The Fourth Amendment also contains a requirement that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”79 Given that overseas U.S. citizens and apparently
LPRs are covered by the Fourth Amendment’s protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures, it might be logical to assume that
such individuals are also protected by the amendment’s Warrant Clause.
However, the Second Circuit, which appears to be the only circuit to
have considered this issue, has ruled otherwise in a case involving only
U.S. citizens, but which presumably would also extend to overseas LPRs.80
Reflecting on comments offered by the Supreme Court in dicta, the Second
74. See id. at 266, 274–75.
75. Id. at 266; see also id. at 283 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[N]othing in the
Court’s opinion questions the validity of the rule, accepted by every Court of Appeals to
have considered the question, that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted
by the United States Government against United States citizens abroad.”).
76. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)
(quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39.
78. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
80. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause does not apply to
overseas searches of U.S. citizens’ property after noting that no other court has considered the
issue).
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Circuit adroitly observed that U.S. judicial officers have no power to issue a
warrant to authorize overseas searches; there is no legal precedent in
U.S. history that requires such a warrant; and even if a U.S. court were
to issue a warrant, it would have little to no legal effect in the foreign
country.81 The Second Circuit therefore concluded that “the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted
abroad by U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy
the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.”82 It is unclear,
however, whether the Second Circuit’s reasoning, though persuasive, will
be adopted by other courts.
Overall, then, though the law in this area is ill-defined, it appears that
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and perhaps the warrant requirement, should apply to LPRs
overseas. As noted above, the U.S. government has already indicted a
number of overseas LPR terrorists83 and no doubt would be interested in
seeking and acquiring evidence to be used against them and other such
terrorists if and when such individuals are brought to justice in U.S. courts.
The LPR status of such terrorists, however, imposes Fourth Amendment
restrictions on the U.S. government and thus limits the government’s ability
to acquire evidence against these individuals for use at trial.
2. Fifth Amendment
The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
protects any “person” from being “deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”84 This therefore requires the U.S. government
to provide due process to any individual protected by this provision before
the government can seize the person’s assets or detain the person. Whether
the Fifth Amendment applies to LPRs overseas, however, is entirely unclear.
Like the Fourth Amendment, it is well established that the Fifth
Amendment protects all individuals inside the United States, including
LPRs.85 The Supreme Court has also long held that the amendment protects

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 169–71.
Id. at 167.
See supra text accompanying notes 7, 16.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
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U.S. citizens overseas.86 However, the Court has made clear that the
amendment does not protect non-LPR aliens outside the sovereign
territory of the United States.87 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to
emphasize that for these non-LPR aliens, its “rejection of extraterritorial
application of the Fifth Amendment was emphatic.”88 Thus, even when
a nonresident alien is at a U.S. border, the nonresident alien is entitled to
no due process—“[t]his Court has long held that an alien seeking initial
admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional
rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens
is a sovereign prerogative.”89
Whether overseas LPRs are or are not entitled to due process under
the Fifth Amendment, however, is not so clear. As noted above, the use
of the term the people in the Fourth Amendment appears to ensure that
the amendment’s protections apply not just to U.S. citizens overseas but
also to LPRs abroad.90 The Fifth Amendment does not use the term the
people to describe who is entitled to due process but rather the term
person, 91 which is generally considered to apply to a much broader
spectrum of individuals.92 As such, it would appear logical that the Fifth
Amendment’s due process protections would apply to overseas LPRs as
well.
Applicable case law appears to support this assertion. Although no
court appears to have considered the due process rights of LPRs who are
overseas, courts have routinely and consistently held that LPRs are
entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s due process protection when they
arrive at a U.S. border after returning from a brief trip abroad.93 As the

86. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957); see also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990) (noting that Reid “decided that United
States citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments”); Yin, supra note 27, at 353 (“[I]t is undisputed that . . . citizens within or
outside the United States are entitled to due process.”).
87. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783–84 (1950); see also VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (noting that under Eisentrager, “we have rejected the claim
that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the
United States”).
88. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269.
89. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 72–78.
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265–66; United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d
1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274).
93. Landon, 459 U.S. at 31 (“The reasoning of Chew was only that a resident alien
returning from a brief trip has a right to due process just as would a continuously present
resident alien.” (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953))); Rafeedie v.
INS, 880 F.2d 506, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[An LPR] has a liberty interest in being
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courts have made clear that U.S. borders are not part of the United States—
as indicated by the courts granting due process rights to non-LPR aliens
inside the United States but not to such aliens at U.S. borders94—it
certainly would appear that by granting due process to LPRs at U.S.
borders, U.S. courts are indicating that LPRs are entitled to due process
whenever they are outside the United States. Put another way, there is
no suggestion in any constitutional, judicial, or scholarly precedent that
constitutional rights are based on geographical proximity to the United
States—neither precedent nor logic suggests that an LPR “magically”
acquires Fifth Amendment rights by being five feet away from the United
States at a border versus ten miles away in Mexico or thousands of miles
away in Somalia or Afghanistan.
The only case law potentially tempering this conclusion is the 1953
Supreme Court case of Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei.95 That
case involved an LPR who had been abroad in Hungary for nineteen
months.96 Upon seeking readmission, the U.S. government determined
that he was a security threat, decided to permanently exclude him from
the United States, and held him at Ellis Island because no other country
would accept him.97 Though noting that “a lawful resident alien may not
captiously be deprived of his constitutional rights to procedural due
process,” the Court nonetheless determined that the LPR in Mezei was
not entitled to due process—specifically, a hearing regarding his detainment
at Ellis Island—presumably due to his “protracted absence” from the
United States, though the opinion is not especially clear.98 However,
Mezei appears to be an aberration, based on the Court being confronted
with the extremely odd factual scenario of having an LPR excluded from
the United States on security grounds but having no place else to go.
Indeed, in the more than sixty years since its issuance, no court appears
to have ever relied upon the Mezei opinion to preclude due process rights
to an LPR.99
permitted to reenter this country and is therefore entitled to due process before he can be
denied admission.”).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 87–89.
95. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
96. See id. at 214.
97. See id. at 207–08.
98. Id. at 213, 214.
99. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33–34 (1982) (determining that
Mezei did not “govern” the case before it as the appellant there “was absent from the
country only a few days, and the United States . . . conceded that she ha[d] a right to due
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Presuming then that the Fifth Amendment does apply to protect LPRs
overseas in the same manner that it protects U.S. citizens abroad, it greatly
limits the ability of the U.S. government to take action against overseas
LPR terrorists. As noted above, the Fifth Amendment precludes the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. This would
therefore require the U.S. government to provide due process before
engaging in a host of activities against an LPR overseas, including seizing
the LPR’s property, or requesting another country to do so,100 or detaining
the LPR, or requesting another country to detain the LPR for questioning.101
The actual amount of due process the government owes an overseas
LPR, however, and the mechanism required for ensuring that due process
are unclear. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that, unlike most other
laws, due process is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.”102 Some commentators assert that due
process in such circumstances always requires prior approval from a federal
judge. The U.S. government though has suggested that, in certain situations,
executive branch review suffices to fulfill the due process requirement
and prior judicial approval is unnecessary.103 Everyone, however, appears
to agree that at least some due process is required.104

process”); Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 521–22 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (determining that
Mezei did not apply to the facts of the case before it).
100. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52, 59
(1993) (holding that the U.S. government must provide due process before seizing
property as part of a civil forfeiture); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (“When the
Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of
Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”); In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that it
is “well settled” that “the Bill of Rights has extraterritorial application to the conduct
abroad of federal agents directed against United States citizens” (quoting United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (reaffirming “the fundamental
nature of a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government
without due process of law” in assessing the due process rights owed to a U.S. citizen
picked up overseas as an enemy combatant and then detained on U.S. soil); Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513, 523–25 (2003) (noting that LPRs are entitled to due process
before being detained); Ferreras v. Ashcroft, 160 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620–21, 629 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding that LPRs are entitled to due process before being placed in detention
after arriving back in the United States from a short trip abroad).
102. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. See Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
104. See id.
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Even if only executive branch review is required in order to comport
with the due process rights of overseas LPRs, that review at the very
least slows the government’s ability to take action against overseas LPR
terrorists. At worst, it may preclude some or indeed all actions that the
government can take against such individuals if the government is unsure
what level of due process is owed or if the LPRs do not meet whatever
due process threshold is determined applicable.
IV. CURRENT MECHANISM EMPLOYED TO REVOKE LPR STATUS
Taken together, the above-mentioned limitations on the U.S.
government’s ability to thwart overseas terrorist LPRs are sufficiently
significant to cause concern. After all, these are individuals who, by having
long ago left U.S. shores to live overseas, have clearly demonstrated no
intention to “permanently reside” in the United States as required for LPR
status. They have then taken the further steps of joining or assisting terrorist
organizations or engaging in terrorist activities that are anathema to the
very country that granted them residency status. Yet, their status as U.S.
LPRs ironically serves to limit the government’s ability to prevent them
from attacking this country. One way to resolve this problem would be for
the U.S. government to mount a vigorous effort to strip them of LPR status.
After all, LPR status is intended to be provided to and maintained by
individuals who actually plan to reside in the United States, not those who
have not only indicated no intention to permanently reside in this country
but are also affirmatively taking action to cause physical harm to it. As
discussed below, U.S. law provides a simple mechanism to strip such LPRs
of their status; however, there is no evidence that any effort has been made
to utilize this option.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the government cannot strip a U.S.
citizen of citizenship unless the citizen “voluntarily relinquishes that
citizenship.”105 This is due to the well-established principle that Congress
does not have “any general power, express or implied, to take away an
American citizen’s citizenship without his assent. . . . In our country the
people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its relationship to
the people by taking away their citizenship.”106 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has stated that the loss of citizenship “is more serious than a taking of
105. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967); see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444
U.S. 252, 260–61 (1980) (reaffirming Afroyim).
106. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
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one’s property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty. For it is safe
to assert that nowhere in the world today is the right of citizenship of
greater worth to an individual than it is in this country.”107 Thus, the
taking of U.S. citizenship would be considered “an extraordinarily severe
penalty.”108
However, the same restrictions do not apply with regard to revoking
the status of LPRs, due to the long-recognized difference between U.S.
citizens and aliens such as LPRs.109 As the Supreme Court noted more
than a century ago, “It is an accepted maxim of international law, that
every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases . . . as it may see fit to
prescribe.”110 Based upon this, the Court has accepted that the U.S.
government “may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.”111
Such power over immigration matters is not a judicial prerogative,
however, but rather falls firmly within the powers of Congress and the
President.112 As the Supreme Court has stated, “Courts have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments
largely immune from judicial control.”113 Indeed, the Court has gone so
far as to assert that “‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power
of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”114
To this end, courts typically grant tremendous deference to Congress and
the President when it comes to immigration matters, including matters
involving the provision and revocation of LPR status.115
The political branches of government have taken their role in governing
immigration matters very seriously, filling an entire volume of the U.S.
Code—Title 8—with laws related to immigration issues, including the

107. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
108. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949).
109. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (indicating
that LPR status can be revoked).
110. Id.
111. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).
112. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (noting that “control over
matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive
and the Legislature”).
113. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
114. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(describing the deference provided to the executive and legislative branches with regard
to LPRs).
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relevant issue of “removal” of aliens such as LPRs.116 Until about fifteen
years ago, the United States had two separate mechanisms for denying
aliens what has been colloquially referred to as “the hospitality of the
United States”: deportation—used when the alien resided in the United
States—and exclusion—used when the alien sought to enter the United
States after being abroad.117 Under current law, however, the “[p]rior
law concepts of ‘exclusion’ and ‘deportation’ are subsumed in . . . ‘removal’
proceedings.”118 Although Title 8 does not explicitly describe what should
happen to an LPR’s status if an LPR is “removed” from this country, the
courts have consistently stripped away such LPR status as part of a final
removal order.119 This, of course, is a logical conclusion—if an LPR is
being deported from or denied entry into the United States, then the LPR
is also being denied permanent residence in this country.
A significant portion of Title 8 is dedicated to removal proceedings.
Section 1229 addresses the mechanisms for initiating removal proceedings,
including the requisite notice that must be provided to the LPR.120
Section 1229a describes the procedure to be used in such proceedings.121
Finally, §§ 1182 and 1227 enumerate various bases upon which an LPR
or other alien can respectively be deported from this country or denied
entry into it.122 These last sections provide a slew of different scenarios that
could lead to an LPR’s—or any alien’s—removal, including the conviction
of certain serious crimes, the falsification of immigration documentation,
and even practicing polygamy.123

116. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012).
117. Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1484 (2012) (quoting Landon, 459 U.S. at
25) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Ferreras v. Ashcroft, 160 F. Supp. 2d 617, 622 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing 8
U.S.C.A. § 1229a (West 1999 & Supp. 2001)).
119. See, e.g., Yakou, 428 F.3d at 247–48 (discussing how, absent statutory guidance,
courts typically strip LPR status as part of a final removal order); In re Duarte, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 329, 332 (B.I.A. 1982) (noting that an LPR is typically divested of LPR status as
part of a final administrative removal order); In re Lok, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 105 (B.I.A.
1981) (stating that the court would “deem[] the lawful permanent resident status of an
alien to end with the entry of a final administrative order of deportation”). Federal courts
generally give extensive deference to the opinions of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(B.I.A.), recognizing the board’s expertise in the area of immigration matters. See Yakou, 428
F.3d at 248.
120. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012).
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012).
122. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2012).
123. See id. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a).
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However, beyond §§ 1182 and 1227, there is another method by which
LPRs can be denied entry into the United States and thus stripped of their
LPR status: abandonment.124 The intent of an LPR to abandon LPR status
can be indicated in several ways.125 Probably the clearest indicator is when
an LPR voluntarily renounces LPR status by filling out U.S. government
form I-407, simply entitled “Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident
Status.”126
However, LPRs can also demonstrate abandonment without even signing
a form, namely by leaving the United States for a prolonged period of
time with “no fixed intent to return.”127 This is contrasted with an LPR’s
ability to make what are known as “temporary visits abroad,” which would
not indicate abandonment of LPR status.128 Generally speaking, a trip is
considered a temporary visit abroad if it is either for a relatively short
period of time fixed by an event or is reasonably expected to terminate in
a relatively short period of time upon the occurrence of an event.129
However, the main issue the courts focus on is intent.130 The intent under
consideration, though, is not whether the LPR expresses an intention to
retain LPR status, but rather whether the LPR has demonstrated an intent to

124. See Yakou, 428 F.3d at 248–49; Maintaining Permanent Residence, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2
a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=3f443a4107083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRC
RD&vgnextchannel=3f443a4107083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Aug.
29, 2013).
125. See Yakou, 428 F.3d at 249.
126. Form I-407, Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/164203/dhs/I-407.pdf (last visited
May 26, 2014); see also Bigler v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 451 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2006)
(signing form to abandon LPR status indicated intent to abandon LPR status); Yakou, 428
F.3d at 249 (noting that signing form I-407 indicates an LPR’s intent to abandon LPR status).
127. Yakou, 428 F.3d at 248 (quoting In re Montero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 399, 401
(B.I.A. 1973)); see also In re Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. 258, 265 n.3 (B.I.A. 1975) (noting
that an LPR’s status had already changed because her trips abroad were not temporary).
Yakou notes that Montero and Kane allow an LPR’s status to change without a formal
removal proceeding. See Yakou, 428 F.3d at 248.
128. See Matadin v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 85, 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1181(b), 1101(a)(27)(A) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing how
an LPR can “abandon” LPR status by remaining abroad for longer than a “temporary
visit”); see also Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 715 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that
an LPR could abandon LPR status by remaining abroad for longer than a temporary visit).
129. See Moin v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2003); Ahmed v. Ashcroft,
286 F.3d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States ex rel. Lesto v. Day, 21 F.2d
307, 308–09 (2d Cir. 1927)); Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 792 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1986)).
130. See, e.g., Ahmed, 286 F.3d at 613 (noting that the dispositive question is whether
the LPR intended to return shortly or abandon LPR status).
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return to the United States in a relatively short period of time.131 Absent
such intent, the LPR is deemed to have lost the intention to maintain status
as a permanent resident of the United States, to have abandoned LPR status,
and will not be readmitted into the United States as an LPR but rather
only as an alien.132 The burden is on the U.S. government to prove such
lack of intent by “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.”133
Courts do not determine an intention to abandon LPR status solely on
elapsed time.134 As one circuit court described the process, “[A] returning
resident does not necessarily abandon his status if he extends his trip
beyond a relatively short period; the key remains whether his activities
are consistent with an intent to return to the United States as soon as
practicable.”135 Thus, the courts do not always focus on an LPR’s
statements of intention to return to the United States but rather evaluate
the LPR’s actions to see if they support such an intention.136 For example,
taking an oath of citizenship for another country, especially if such an
oath involves a renunciation of all other foreign affiliation, is indicative of
an abandonment of status.137 Courts also often look to the LPR’s family
ties, property holdings, and business interests—both in the United States
and abroad—as indicia of intent either to return to the United States after
a temporary visit abroad or to remain overseas for a long duration.138

131. Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 103 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Singh, 113 F.3d at 1514); Moin, 335 F.3d at 419 (quoting Singh, 113 F.3d at 1514);
Ahmed, 286 F.3d at 613.
132. See Karimijanaki, 579 F.3d at 719; Katebi v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 463, 466 (1st
Cir. 2005); Moin, 335 F.3d at 420–21; Ahmed, 286 F.3d at 613.
133. Matadin, 546 F.3d at 91; see also Hana v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 472, 475 (6th
Cir. 2005) (noting that the government needed to prove lack of intent by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence); Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1003, 1006
(9th Cir. 2003) (same).
134. See Katebi, 396 F.3d at 466.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Bigler v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 451 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2006);
Khodagholian, 335 F.3d at 1007.
137. See Richards v. Sec’y of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985) (determining
that taking a Canadian oath that includes the statement “I hereby renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign sovereign or state of whom or which I may at this time be a
subject or citizen” constitutes a renunciation of U.S. citizenship); United States v.
Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1189 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994)
(implying that taking a foreign oath can be indicative of renouncing U.S. citizenship);
Kahane v. Shultz, 653 F. Supp. 1486, 1492–93 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
138. See, e.g., Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 715 (6th Cir. 2009); Katebi,
396 F.3d at 466–67; Khodagholian, 335 F.3d at 1007.
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Nonetheless, time away from the United States is still a critical ingredient
in the analysis, with absences of more than one year considered an
indication of abandonment.139 Basically, as one commentator has noted,
courts often look to the amount of time an LPR has been a resident in the
United States to determine issues regarding citizenship, finding that long
periods of residence serve as indicators of attachment to the United States;
applying the same logic, long periods away from the United States indicate
just the opposite intent—the LPR’s lack of attachment to this country.140
The problem is that U.S. courts engage in such analysis only for outof-status LPR cases brought before them. And the only cases that appear to
have been brought before the courts are with regard to LPRs seeking
entry into the United States. There is no indication that abandonment cases
have yet been brought against out-of-status LPRs who reside overseas
but have not yet sought to reenter the United States, such as the out-ofstatus terrorist LPRs at issue in this discussion.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTION: REVOKING LPR STATUS FOR OUT-OF-STATUS
LPRS ENGAGED IN TERRORISM
The current standard mechanism for stripping the LPR status of outof-status LPRs—which is to wait for them to seek readmission to the
United States—is not only a passive mechanism for revoking LPR status
but it also does not solve the problem of LPR terrorists who have been
abroad for years and have demonstrated no intention of returning. As
noted above, these individuals continue to be protected by various segments
of the U.S. Constitution and several U.S. statutes, therefore denying the
U.S. government the full ability to thwart them from attacking the United
States.
To resolve this problem, the U.S. government could initiate affirmative
steps to strip such individuals of their LPR status. Although I believe
that the law permits such action for any out-of-status LPR, the U.S.
government need not use its power so expansively but could instead
focus its attention on those out-of-status LPRs who engage in terrorism.
Not only do such individuals pose the most immediate threat to U.S.
national security but the limitations imposed by their LPR status place
the greatest restrictions on the U.S. government to thwart that threat.
Ordinary out-of-status LPRs pose no real threat to the United States, and
therefore the United States does not generally need to find, track, and

139. See Bigler, 451 F.3d at 733 (asserting that one indicator of abandonment is
absence from the United States for more than one year); see supra text accompanying
note 44.
140. Morawetz, supra note 36, at 230.
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take action against them. The exact opposite is true with regard to outof-status LPR terrorists.
Once the U.S. government has identified an out-of-status LPR whom
the government believes is involved in terrorism, the government could
then initiate proceedings against that individual in immigration court
using the exact same procedures that already exist for removal cases.141
Service could be made on the LPR’s last known address, notifying the
LPR of the proceedings initiated against him or her, the LPR’s right to
appear with counsel and contest the allegations, and the date, place, and
time of any hearing.142 If the LPR appears, the revocation proceeding
would go forward as any removal proceeding.143 If the LPR fails to appear,
the case could proceed in absentia.144 In either case, the government
would bear the burden of proving that the LPR has abandoned status.145
If the court revokes the person’s LPR status, notice of the revocation
would be sent to the LPR’s last known address.146 The LPR then would
have the opportunity to seek to reopen the hearing in order to contest the
revocation.147
The benefits of this plan would be to create a process for revoking the
status of these overseas LPR terrorists, and once these LPRs are stripped
of their status, the U.S. government could invoke its full range of options
to collect and share information on such individuals, gather information
to prosecute them, and take steps to prevent them from attacking this
country. This plan also benefits from the fact that the U.S. government
would not need to prove or even allege that the LPR is engaged in
terrorism.148 Rather, the U.S. government need merely prove that the
LPR abandoned his or her LPR status. On its face, this may seem unfair
to the LPR. After all, the U.S. government is targeting the LPR for
revocation based on the LPR’s alleged ties to terrorism; should not the
U.S. government need to prove that connection? The answer is no. The
basis for granting an individual LPR status in the first place is for that
141. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229–1229a (2012).
142. See id.
143. See id. § 1229a.
144. See id. § 1229a(b)(5).
145. See id. § 1229a(c)(3).
146. See id. § 1229a(c)(5).
147. See id. § 1229a(c)(6).
148. See, e.g., Bigler v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 451 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2006)
(listing factors that aid courts in determining whether LPRs abandoned their status and
not mentioning terrorism as a factor).
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person to be a permanent resident in the United States. As noted above,
LPRs regularly have their status revoked for abandoning their residency
by indicating that they have no intention to permanently reside in the
United States. The same rules should apply to overseas LPRs suspected of
terrorism; the U.S. government should not bear an additional burden merely
because the individual is believed to be a terrorist. Put another way, the
U.S. government’s belief that an LPR is involved in terrorism is merely
a mechanism for prioritizing which out-of-status LPRs to target for
revocation; it is not a required provision for actually revoking LPR status.
Admittedly, current statutes already permit removal of LPRs—and thus
revocation of LPR status—for various terrorist-related reasons that do
not require a showing of abandonment.149 Indeed, Congress has
even passed legislation creating a special court to allow for the removal
of such aliens from the United States in an expeditious and confidential
manner. 150 However, these options do not appear to be effective
mechanisms for solving the problem. To begin with, the special court
applies only to removal of aliens who are “physically present in the United
States,”151 which does not apply to overseas terrorist LPRs. Further, the
special court has never actually been used.152
In addition, seeking to revoke LPR status based on ties to terrorism is
more difficult than seeking revocation for abandonment because it is
very difficult to prove terrorism.153 Witnesses are difficult to locate and
often loathe to testify; evidence is hard to procure, especially if the terrorist
is merely in the planning stages; and much of the information against the
individual may be classified, meaning that proving the individual’s ties
to terrorism might jeopardize sensitive material.154 Given that proving
abandonment does not raise these concerns and is a valid basis in and of
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012).
150. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1534 (2012).
151. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(ii).
152. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531–1537 (West 2005) (denoting no case law with regard
to the special terrorist removal court in notes of decisions); John Dorsett Niles, Note,
Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 57 DUKE L.J. 1833,
1834 & n.4 (2008) (citing Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens,
85 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1723 (2007)) (noting that the terrorist removal court has never
been used).
153. See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of
Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 274–75 (2010) (noting that
prosecuting terrorist-like pirates might be difficult because of “lack of evidence, the cost
of presenting the evidence, the danger of asylum requests, or the strain on military
operations” and that prosecuting trained terrorists is probably even more difficult); see
also U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, DIGEST OF TERRORIST CASES 79 (2010), available
at https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf (explaining the
extreme difficulty in investigating terrorist attacks).
154. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 153, at 70–83.
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itself for revoking LPR status, it makes more sense for the U.S. government
to pursue the path of abandonment.
The key question, of course, is whether revoking the LPR status of
out-of-status LPR terrorists is legal. The answer is yes. Even though the
law in this area is, like most things related to LPRs, murky at best, it appears
that current statutes authorize such revocation and that such revocation
comports with due process, including legally adequate notice.
A. Current Statutes Permit Revocation of an Overseas LPR’s Status
As noted above, § 1229a of Title 8 of the U.S. Code provides the
guidelines for removal proceedings.155 That statutory provision states
that an “immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the
inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”156 It explicitly asserts that the
procedure outlined in the statute is the “sole and exclusive procedure” for
admitting or deporting an alien to or from the United States.157 Courts take
this concept of exclusivity seriously—even rules and entitlements under the
Administrative Procedures Act are considered inapplicable to removal
proceedings.158
Whether the statutory scheme in § 1229a applies to stripping an overseas
LPR of status does not appear to have ever been considered by the courts.
The legislative history of the statute also provides no clues. Certainly,
stripping an LPR of status cannot be deemed a “deportability of an
alien” issue as that clearly applies only to individuals already inside the
United States. Possibly, however, it could fall under the concept of
inadmissibility.159 Unfortunately, that term is not defined in Title 8 or
anywhere else in the statutory code. The closest definition in Title 8 is
for the terms admission or admitted, which are defined as “with respect
to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”160 Presuming that
inadmissibility is the antithesis of this definition, one could assert
that revoking an overseas LPR’s status would fall within its confines as

155. See supra text accompanying note 121.
156. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012).
157. Id. § 1229a(a)(3) (2012).
158. See, e.g., Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).
159. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (providing that judges may conduct proceedings
for “inadmissibility”).
160. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012).
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the U.S. government is effectively determining that the LPR no longer
has a lawful basis for entering or residing in the United States. Further,
when the concepts of exclusion and deportation were merged together to
fall under the overarching concept of removal,161 one could certainly
interpret it as Congress seeking to eliminate any loopholes in the
immigration law to ensure that one procedure covered all immigration
matters involving the authority to reside in or enter the United States.
A further issue is that § 1229a seems to contemplate that the only
grounds for removal proceedings are those enumerated in §§ 1182 and
1227 of Title 8,162 and the bases for abandonment of LPR status come
from neither of these sections of the code.163 Yet courts nonetheless appear
to use the removal process when evaluating abandonment cases.164
Therefore, it seems that the current removal process outlined in § 1229a
would cover the proposed revocation of overseas LPRs’ status based on
abandonment.
However, if the courts determine that § 1229a does not cover revocation
of overseas LPR status through abandonment, the President could issue a
statement so clarifying. Section 1182 of Title 8 authorizes the President,
by proclamation, to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens
as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any
restrictions he may deem to be appropriate” in any situation where he
“finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United
States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”165
Presidents have previously invoked this provision in several situations,
including authorizing the interdiction of any undocumented aliens on the
high seas or in the Caribbean region, where there is reason to believe
aliens seek entry into the United States.166 And certainly out-of-status LPR
terrorists would constitute a class of aliens whose entry into this country

161. See supra text accompanying notes 117–18.
162. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2) (2012) (“An alien placed in proceedings under this
section may be charged with any applicable ground of inadmissibility under section
1182(a) of this title or any applicable ground of deportability under section 1227(a) of
this title.”).
163. See supra text accompanying note 124.
164. See, e.g., Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 713–14, 719 (6th Cir. 2009)
(upholding a removal hearing conducted under § 1229a in which an LPR was determined
to have abandoned LPR status); Bigler v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 451 F.3d 728, 732 (11th
Cir. 2006) (same); Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 611, 612–13 (2d Cir. 2002) (same).
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012).
166. See Exec. Order No. 13,276, 3 C.F.R. 252 (2003), reprinted as amended in 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (proclaiming interdiction of illegal aliens in the Caribbean);
Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (Sept. 29, 1981) (proclaiming interdiction
of illegal aliens in the high seas).
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“would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”167
Alternatively, of course, Congress can always pass legislation that
amends § 1229a to clarify that it includes revocation of status of out-ofstatus LPRs.
B. Due Process
Assuming the § 1229a mechanism is available to revoke the status of
overseas LPRs, the issue arises whether the use of such a mechanism
would violate the due process rights of those LPRs. The Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”168 As
noted above, as a general matter, LPRs appear to be entitled to the Fifth
Amendment’s due process protection even when overseas.169
However, general due process protection does not apply to every action
undertaken by the United States but only to actions that deprive the
individual of “life, liberty, or property.”170 Therefore, it is necessary first to
determine whether LPR status in and of itself is a life, liberty, or property
interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. As with most aspects of LPR
status, the courts have not provided a firm answer to this question.
However, all indications are that LPR status is considered an important
property or liberty right protected by the Fifth Amendment.
In the Supreme Court case of Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, an LPR
served as a seaman on an American vessel that often travelled overseas.171
When he returned from one of his trips, U.S. immigration officials deemed
him an alien who would not be readmitted to the United States and
detained him on Ellis Island.172 The Court held that the petitioner was
entitled to due process:
While it may be that a resident alien’s ultimate right to remain in the United
States is subject to alteration by statute or authorized regulation because of a
voyage undertaken by him to foreign ports, it does not follow that he is thereby
deprived of his constitutional right to procedural due process. His status as a

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See supra text accompanying note 165.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See supra Part III.C.2.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
344 U.S. 590, 594, 601 (1953).
See id. at 594–95.
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person within the meaning and protection of the Fifth Amendment cannot be
capriciously taken from him.173

Other courts and commentators have provided similar language
indicating that LPR status is itself a protected right. Justice Souter, for
example, has noted that “any decision about the requirements of due process
for an LPR must account for the difficulty of distinguishing in practical
as well as doctrinal terms between the liberty interest of an LPR and that
of a citizen.”174 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit and Southern District Court of
New York have echoed the important “liberty interest” held by LPRs.175
This appears to be an appropriate result. LPR status is highly valuable
to the aliens who possess it. Such status is considered the gold standard for
aliens and brings with it significant benefits.176 Further, LPRs might not
only have strong personal ties to the United States, such as resident family
members, but may have already provided considerable benefit to this
country as well, including payment of taxes, establishment of a business,
and service in the military.177 As the D.C. Circuit has noted, “These ties
give the permanent resident alien a stake in the United States substantial
enough to command the protection of due process before he may be
excluded or deported; the result, after all, may be to separate him from
family, friends, property, and career . . . .”178
There is also a logical reason to give due process to overseas LPRs
when seeking to revoke their LPR status. Before the government can
strip away a status as significant as LPR status due to alleged abandonment,
the U.S. government should be required to prove its basis for believing

173. Id. at 601 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Supreme Court found
that the Chew case differs factually from Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 214 (1953), discussed supra text accompanying notes 95–99 and issued in the
same Supreme Court term, for several reasons, including the fact that Chew was gone for
only four months, in contrast with Mezei’s nineteen month absence.
174. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 547 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing the due process rights of LPRs).
175. See Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that LPRs
have a “liberty interest” protected by the Fifth Amendment to reside in the United States
after traveling overseas); St. John v. McElroy, 917 F. Supp. 243, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting that an “important liberty interest is at stake” when an LPR is excluded from
entering the United States after being abroad); see also Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due
Process: The Need for Procedural Reform in “Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. Kim,
31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 67 (2006) (“A lawful permanent resident without
a final order of removal has a significant liberty interest, one barely distinguishable from
the interest of a citizen.” (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 544)).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39.
177. See Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of
Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REV.
637, 643–44 (2012).
178. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 522.
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the status has been abandoned. Otherwise, the U.S. government could
unilaterally and capriciously determine an LPR to have abandoned
status—a designation that in and of itself would not only deprive the
LPR of the status but also unilaterally deprive the LPR of the opportunity to
contest the very claim of abandonment that led to the revocation of the
status. Bolstering this is the fact that the courts have repeatedly indicated
that the key factor in abandonment is intent, not merely time outside of
the country.179 Thus, although the objective determination of time out of
the country might be easy for the government to demonstrate, the subjective
question of intent is one that is a matter of debate and therefore should
be decided by a neutral arbitrator after providing the LPR the opportunity to
present the LPR’s point of view on the subject.
Assuming that out-of-status LPRs possess due process rights, it is well
established that such rights encompass both a substantive and procedural
facet.180 Substantive due process protects against government conduct
that “shock[s] the conscience”181 or interferes with rights “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”182 Procedural due process prohibits the
government from depriving someone of life, liberty, or property without
prior notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.183 In the
immigration context, procedural due process has long required that an
LPR receive “notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least
before an executive or administrative tribunal.”184 As noted in Part V.A
of this Article, § 1229a establishes a set statutory procedure for removal
179. See supra text accompanying notes 130–33.
180. See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998).
181. See id. at 855.
182. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 796 (1969).
183. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting deprivation of “life, liberty, or property”
without due process); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48
(1993) (“Our precedents establish the general rule that individuals must receive notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property.”).
184. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597 (1953); see also Pierre v.
Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 776 (2d Cir. 2009) (“It is well-established that a lawful permanent
resident is entitled to constitutional due process in removal proceedings. . . . ‘At the core
of due process is the right to notice of the nature of the charges and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 346,
350 (2d Cir. 2004))); De Araujo v. Gonzáles, 457 F.3d 146, 154 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The
Supreme Court has long held that a permanent resident alien is protected under the Fifth
Amendment and entitled to due process in the form of notice of the charges against him
and a deportation hearing.” (citing Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596–98; Choeum v.
INS, 129 F.3d 29, 38–40 (1st Cir. 1997))).
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cases. This procedure includes detailed notice provisions to the LPR of
the nature, time, and place of the removal hearing, as well as the right to
counsel.185 It further requires a hearing before a neutral immigration
judge, in which the LPR has the right to examine the evidence against him
or her, present evidence, cross-examine government witnesses, and appeal
the immigration judge’s decision.186 The statute also describes the
consequences to the LPR by failing to appear.187
Courts have routinely and consistently found that the removal of an
LPR resulting in the stripping of status, as well as the § 1229a mechanism
for such removal, comport with both substantive and procedural due
process.188 As revoking the status of out-of-status LPR terrorists could
utilize this exact same procedure, it too should fulfill due process
requirements.
One issue, however, needs to be examined in more detail. It can be
presumed that most out-of-status terrorist LPRs have not informed the U.S.
government that they no longer reside in this country and almost certainly
have not provided the government with an exact forwarding address where
they can be found. The question therefore arises whether the § 1229a
process of providing notice of the hearing to strip the overseas terrorist of
LPR status would be adequate, and equally important, whether the U.S.
government can proceed to strip an out-of-status terrorist LPR of status if
the LPR fails to appear at the hearing. I address that question next.
C. Notice Requirements for Revoking LPR Status
U.S. law requires all aliens, including LPRs, to register themselves
with the U.S. government if they remain in the United States for more
than thirty days.189 That registration includes providing a current address.190
If an alien who is in the United States changes addresses, the alien is
required by law to notify the U.S. government in writing of the new address

185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012).
186. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012).
187. See id. § 1229a(a)(5)(A).
188. See, e.g., Nolasco v. Holder, 637 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an alien
receives notice of [the information required under § 1229a] and a meaningful opportunity to
participate in her removal proceedings, due process is satisfied.”); Ovalles v. Holder, 577
F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that an LPR removed under the general removal
process of § 1229a receives “sufficient due process”); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489
F.3d 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the U.S. government’s normal deportation
hearings process complies with due process).
189. See 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
190. See U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Form I-94, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://forms.cbp.gov/pdf/arrival.pdf (last visited
May 26, 2014).
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within ten days of the change.191 Such notification of a change of address is
quite simple and can be done over the Internet.192 Willful failure to
register or provide notice of a change of address might not only preclude
an LPR from receiving notice of a removal hearing but is actually a
misdemeanor, subject to fine and imprisonment, and indeed is a basis in
and of itself for removal.193
An LPR is expressly alerted of the obligation to keep the U.S.
government informed of any change of address in numerous ways, beyond
the above published statutes. For example, the website of the U.S.
government agency in charge of immigration issues—the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)—explicitly informs an LPR
that the LPR “must advise . . . [the U.S. government] of a change of
address” and provides a link to a form to do so.194 Even more explicit,
the requirement to notify the government of a change of address is clearly
stated in the very application that an individual fills out in order to apply
for LPR status.195 Form I-485 very clearly provides,
I understand and acknowledge that, under section 262 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) . . . I am required to provide USCIS with my current address
and written notice of any change of address within 10 days of the change. I
understand and acknowledge that USCIS will use the most recent address that I
provide to USCIS, on any form containing these acknowledgements, for all
purposes, including the service of a Notice to Appear should it be necessary for
USCIS to initiate removal proceedings against me. I understand and acknowledge
that if I change my address without providing written notice to USCIS, I will be
held responsible for any communications sent to me at the most recent address
that I provided to USCIS. I further understand and acknowledge that, if removal
proceedings are initiated against me and I fail to attend any hearing, including
an initial hearing based on service of the Notice to Appear at the most recent
address that I provided to USCIS or as otherwise provided by law, I may be
ordered removed in my absence, arrested, and removed from the United States.196

191. See 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 265.1 (2012).
192. See Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.
gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2da73
a4107083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=2da73a4107083210Vgn
VCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Mar. 30, 2011) (“You must advise USCIS of a
change of address. To update your address, see the ‘Change of Address Information’ page.”).
193. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1306(a)–(b) (2012).
194. See Adjustment of Status, supra note 192.
195. See Form I-485, Application To Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf (last
visited May 26, 2014).
196. Id.
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By statute, if personal service on an alien is not practical, service of notice
of a removal hearing can be made by mail to the last address provided by
the alien.197 Courts have continuously upheld such service by mail as
conforming with due process even if the alien moved residences, as it is the
alien’s “affirmative duty” to update the alien’s address upon moving.198
If the alien fails to appear after such written notice has been provided,
the proceeding can nonetheless continue against the alien in absentia, and
the alien can be ordered removed if the government proves its case.199
As the Ninth Circuit has summarized, in upholding deportation of an alien
where the deportation hearing proceeded in absentia because the alien
failed to notify the government of her updated address,
The “Supreme Court has made it clear that notice must be such as is reasonably
calculated to reach interested parties.” An alien “does not have to actually receive
notice of a deportation hearing in order for the requirements of due process to
be satisfied.” Due process “is satisfied if service is conducted in a manner
‘reasonably calculated’ to ensure that notice reaches the alien.” The government
satisfies notice requirements “by mailing notice of the hearing to an alien at the
address last provided to the [government].” If an alien fails to appear at the
removal hearing, an [immigration judge] may enter an order of removal in absentia
so long as these notice requirements are met.200

Although conducting removal cases in absentia is not preferred, the
practice has been continuously upheld by the courts. As the Second Circuit
noted, in quoting a Seventh Circuit case, “Clearly, ‘[t]he availability of
recourse to a constitutionally sufficient administrative procedure satisfies
due process requirements if the complainant merely declines or fails to
take advantage of the administrative procedure.’”201 The alien can later
seek to contest a removal done in absentia, though there is a “strong
presumption of effective service” where notice was sent by certified mail
through the U.S. Postal Service to the alien’s last known address, even if

197. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)–(c) (2012).
198. See, e.g., Sousa v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding removal
of an alien in absentia when a Notice to Appear was sent to the alien’s last known address but
the alien had failed to notify the U.S. government that he had changed addresses).
199. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(5)(A) (2012); Ghounem v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 740,
743 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that the law permits an immigration judge “to hold removal
proceedings in absentia if aliens are given proper notice”); Dominguez v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., 284 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[N]otice to the alien at the
most recent address provided by the alien is sufficient notice, and . . . there can be an in
absentia removal after such notice.”).
200. Popa v. Holder, 571 F.3d 890, 897–98 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (quoting
Dobrota v. INS, 311 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002); Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796
(9th Cir. 1997)).
201. Ali v. Reno, 22 F.3d 442, 449 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Dusanek v. Hannon,
677 F.2d 538, 542–43 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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nobody signed for it.202 The alien can contest a removal in absentia only by
filing a motion to reopen in which the alien must demonstrate that the
alien failed to appear due to “exceptional circumstances,” lack of proper
notice, or being in state or federal custody.203 However, courts routinely
reject motions to reopen in cases where the alien’s claim of lack of notice is
a result of the alien’s failure to inform the government of a change of
address.204 As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “Failing to provide [the
government] with a change of address will preclude the alien from claiming
that [the government] did not provide him or her with notice of a
hearing.”205
Therefore, the U.S. government would appear to provide adequate notice
of a removal hearing to even an out-of-status LPR if the government sends
the notice by certified mail to the LPR’s last known address. If the LPR
has since moved from that last address and failed to inform the government
of the new address as statutorily required, the fault lies with the LPR; the
government has nonetheless complied with its notice requirement and
provided adequate due process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Immigration is a hot topic these days. It is the subject of headline articles
in newspapers and magazines and an issue of intense debate in Congress.206
President Obama has made it clear that immigration reform is one of his
top domestic policies, indicating that the failure to overhaul the immigration
system in the United States was the biggest failure of his first term in
office.207 As the President has stated, “We’ve known for years that our

202. See In re Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. 27, 37 (B.I.A. 1995); see also Mejia-Hernandez
v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding removal of an alien in absentia
where notice was by certified mail but noting that regular mail service would result in a
“weaker presumption” of effective notice).
203. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2012); Ghounem, 378 F.3d at 743.
204. See, e.g., Vukmirovic v. Holder, 640 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2011).
205. Dominguez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 284 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam).
206. See, e.g., Briefing, TIME, Jan. 21, 2013, at 9 (noting that the U.S. government
is spending more money on agencies enforcing immigration laws than on all other federal law
enforcement agencies combined); Vargas, supra note 46; Zachary A. Goldfarb & Rosalind
Helderman, Obama Makes His Immigration Push, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2013), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2013-01-29/politics/36609464_1_illegal-immigrants-immigration-lawsimmigration-reform.
207. See Goldfarb & Helderman, supra note 206.
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immigration system is broken . . . . After avoiding the problem for years,
the time has come to fix it once and for all.”208 Republican leaders too
have generally embraced the need for reforming the immigration system.209
Top U.S. business and labor groups are focusing intensely on the issue.210
Even religious conservatives, who have usually shied away from the matter,
are generally providing strong public support for revising the nation’s
immigration policy.211
However, one aspect of the immigration issue that has not been discussed
as part of this overhaul, and indeed has gone entirely unnoticed as a
general matter, is the significant problem posed by overseas LPR terrorists.
Although Americans would like to believe that people they have permitted
to reside in the United States, and to whom they have provided virtually
all of the advantages and protections that the country has to offer, would
not seek to harm them, the hard truth indicates this is not always the case.
There is a significant number of LPRs residing overseas who are plotting
terrorist attacks against this country. And their LPR status is hindering
the ability of the U.S. government to stop them.
Although virtually every facet of law regarding overseas LPRs and their
status is ill-defined at best, a fair reading of the limited statutory and case
law on the topic indicates that the government currently has the authority
to strip these out-of-status individuals of their status as LPRs. Employing
already existing removal procedures and the concept of abandonment,
the U.S. government could revoke the LPR status of these individuals
and thus take significant steps to allow the United States to find, track,
share information on, gather evidence against, and prevent attacks by
these currently protected terrorists. And, of course, the U.S. government
208. Julie Pace, Obama Calls for April Debate on Immigration Bill, YAHOO! NEWS
(Mar. 25, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/obama-calls-april-debate-immigrationbill-155819076--politics.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. See Chris Cillizza, Republicans Find Religion on Immigration Reform. Is It Too
Late?, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2012, 12:54 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2012/11/09/republicans-find-religion-on-immigration-reform-is-it-too-late/ (noting
that Republican House Speaker John Boehner has stated that a “comprehensive approach
[for reforming immigration policy] is long overdue”); Rachel Weiner, Republicans on
Immigration Reform: Before and After, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/20/the-startling-speed-of-the-gops-shift-onimmigration/.
210. See Ashley Parker & Steven Greenhouse, Guest Workers at Crux of Deal on
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, at A1.
211. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Religious Conservatives Make Moral Case for
Immigration Reform, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2013-03-20/politics/37870308_1_illegal-immigrants-immigration-laws-immigration-disc
ussion (noting that the Evangelical Immigration Table, a coalition of religious groups
representing more than 100,000 churches, is initiating a grassroots push on immigration
issues).
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can always pass new legislation and create new case law on the issue if
current law is deemed inadequate.
Though this issue of overseas LPR terrorists is not new, it has remained
almost entirely outside of public view and awareness. This has not made
it any less dangerous a concern but merely an unappreciated facet of the
fight against terrorism, much like aviation hijacking prior to 9/11. It is
now time not just to take the first step of acknowledging the existence of
the problem but also to consider the appropriate next steps that need to
be taken to resolve that problem. The United States cannot afford to wait
for an attack by one of these out-of-status LPR terrorists before deciding
to act.
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